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Abstract  
 Populism is the 'new big thing' in western politics. On both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean, populist leaders, movements and parties are obtaining a 
growing political consent. Staring from this empirical evidence, the article 
reconstructs the three main strands that constitute the scientific reflexion on 
populism showing the limits that every single strand have and proposing a new 
definition of populism based on a multidimensional and syncretic approach 
that can account for the complexity of the normative common roots that link 
populism to democratic theory.  
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Introduction 
 In introducing a famous volume edited by the two scholars and 
published in 1969, in which some leading scholar tried to systematize the 
debate on populism which was helded in 1967 at the London School of 
Economics (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969), Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, 
paraphrasing a more famous political 'Manifesto', claimed that 'a spectrum is 
wandering around the world: populism'. Fifty years later, that categorical 
affirmation seems to be more real than ever, almost nothing has changed in 
spite of such a length of time that has seen a radical transformation of the entire 
planet. Though, at the end of the seventies, populism seemed to be a 'residual' 
political phenomenon, mainly limited to some Latin American states and in 
the run-out. But today, once again, populism seems to confirm its 'karstic' and 
potentially ubiquitous nature. This, after more or less long periods during 
which it almost completely loses its tracks, in the result of an absent or 
marginal element of the political process, reappeared in unexpected places and 
forms to raise his challenge to democracy once again, as if democracy itself 
can never be permanently free of it, that it is for some reason never definitively 
clarified forced to infinite coexistence more or less turbulent with this host so 
cramped and elusive as, often undesirable. 
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 The sensation, largely supported by the scientific literature, is that 
populism and democracy share inevitably elements of foundation, a common 
'nature' that renders democratic practice impossible without being present in a 
latent or manifest form even with a certain degree of populism. To question 
the populist challenge to democracy, means first of all, to try to define in a 
sufficiently clear way the two terms of the report that you want to investigate. 
Only a careful and articulated conceptualization of populism and democracy 
can provide the explanatory elements needed to answer the questions posed 
by the very idea of a populist challenge to democracy. 
 
I. 
 What is the relationship between populism and democracy, then? With 
reference to the now extensive literature on populism, it can be stated that 
currently, there is no consensus on the type of relationship that populism 
establishes with democracy. A very narrow review of this literature suggests, 
in fact, highly differentiated and often contrasting visions of our object of 
investigation. For example, the philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö, arguing around 
the various forms of ideals and practices of democracy, defined populism as 
the "purest form of democracy" (Tännsjö, 1992) while, on the contrary, Nadia 
Urbinati repeatedly warned readers of the subversive and undemocratic 
potential that would reside within the conceptual nucleus of populism 
(Urbinati, 1998; Urbinati, 2014). Likewise, Marco Tarchi, having noted that 
"All recent studies have led to the finding that the direct appeal to the people 
as a source of political sovereignty, placed outside and above any 
representation, is becoming more and more diffused" (Tarchi, 2015: 375) 
states that "(...) within populist optics democracy has a plebiscitary 
connotation and ends up being seen as plebiscite acclamation and not as a 
system of rules" (Ivi, pg.78).  
 In the midst of these cases that come to opposite conclusions, a 
plethora of authors has expressed intermediate positions proposing an idea of 
radical ambiguity between the relationship between populism and democracy. 
For example, in one of the most important works produced on the subject, 
Margaret Canovan clearly outlines the potential of democratic mobilization 
inherent in populist politics and suggests that populism is a 'shadow' of 
democracy ready to take form and consistency insofar as modern democracies 
are incapable of balancing the liberal-constitutional component with the 
participatory one attributable to the will of the people. Within this theoretical 
proposition, populism, in addition to being co-founded with the same 
democracy, would be "a redemptive political style that shakes within the 
structure of modern democracy against the alienating effects produced by the 
cold pragmatism of political representation" (Canovan, 1999) and, therefore, 
populism would essentially not be a deadly challenge to democracy, but rather 
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as a corrective and an integration/ extension of democracy itself. And that the 
relationship between populism and democracy is pervaded by ambiguities and 
contradictions are also confirmed by other relevant authors such as Benjamin 
Arditi, Michael Kazin and Ernesto Laclau, who emphasize, with different 
accents and nuances, that populism, while presenting elements of ambiguity 
that make it potentially dangerous for democratic regimes making it not so 
much a 'shadow' as a 'spectrum' of democracy (Arditi, 2004), it must be and 
above all conceived as a policy strategy that is based and allows the inclusion 
of new social groups within the democratic process (Arditi, 2003; Kazin 1995; 
Laclau 2005) and prevent the oligarchic closure of political systems (Arditi, 
2003). Thus, populism would be the main juncture map that would reveal what 
social conditions and demands are not sufficiently satisfied by contemporary 
democratic systems (Bobbio 1984, Taggart 2004, Arditi 2004; Arditi 2007, 
Laclau 2005). Populism would therefore be the most obvious symptom of a 
"political malaise" that would pervade contemporary democracies.  
 A 'malaise' is so widespread that even government parties, normally 
not cataloged within political actors of populist nature, take on political 
elements of populist rhetoric, thus generating a real populist contagion and a 
situation that Cas Mudde can define in terms of "populist Zeitgeist" (Mudde, 
2014). Given the literature reached on populism and democracy may continue 
for a long time, however, I believe that the examples presented are sufficient 
to show that there is not enough agreement on the issue of relations between 
populism and democracy, and therefore every work that wants to deal with 
this theme must necessarily address the problem of why this consensus is 
missing and if and how to overcome this situation. At first sight, the field of 
study in question seems to be characterized by an excess of complexity. 
Concepts as broad as those of populism and democracy can be difficult to 
'handle' altogether, and this 'thickness' of key concepts could produce 
excessive complexity of analysis when one wants to move towards the field 
of relationships that lie between them. However, in my opinion, the difficulty 
in focusing the relationships that necessarily lie between populism and 
democracy must be mainly attributed to a defect of partial conceptualization 
of the two terms and, consequently, to an equally partial or confused reading 
of their reciprocal relations. In most of the works that make up the 
bibliographic reference corpus, the effort to make these complex key concepts 
theoretically 'manageable' translates into an excess of schematism that 
produces too limited and peculiar optics to render justice to the complexity of 
the object of study. This results in a fragmented literature in which every 
author tends to propose his own idea of populism by highlighting some 
essential but not exhaustive aspects of the phenomenon and, consequently, 
partial and therefore almost inevitably contradictory conclusions. Partial 
definitions of the populist phenomenon are often associated with too 
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schematic conception of democracy and the overall result is a sub-
understanding of both phenomena and, above all, of the relationships that bind 
them so firmly in time. It is therefore necessary to re-establish the complexity 
of the phenomena studied in order to be able to better investigate their 
interrelations.  
 
Three ideas of populism 
 In a famous essay of 1969, Isaiah Berlin called 'the Cinderella 
complex' of populism, that is, "there is a shoe in the form of populism, but no 
foot that can fit it perfectly" (Berlin, 1969; in Tarchi, 2014: 28). By proposing 
this paradox, it is evident that Berlin considers it possible and useful to find a 
stable and specific conceptual nucleus that would allow it to identify 'a heart', 
'an essence' (Zanatta, 2002). The idea of defining the "cognitive and regulatory 
hard core" (Mény & Surel, 2000: 279) of the concept of populism have 
adhered to various authors in time and in a growing way and it is therefore 
legitimate to identify in this part of the literature a first set of studies on 
populism that investigated it by researching its 'ideological' essence. The 
different authors who can be traced back to this approach share the idea, made 
explicit by Paul Taggart, that the different empirical cases of populism they 
can be traced back to a 'thin ideology' (Freeden, 1996; Taggart 2004) 
.Populism, therefore, would have "many attributes of ideology but not all" 
(Taggart, 2000; cited in Zanatta , 2002:15) In particular, populism would be 
"(...) an ideology that considers society permanently divided into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' against the 'corrupt 
elite', and who argues that politics should be the expression of the general will 
of the people " (Mudde 2014: 544). 
 At the thread that has focused its efforts in the direction of identifying 
the idealpictual and ideological elements that can share all the different 
experiences that have been cataloged within populism, historically has 
opposed a set of studies that defined the populist phenomenon in terms of 
'political style' and 'political discourse'. This course of study (see for example: 
Canovan, 1999; Kazin, 1995; Taguieff, 1995; Laclau, 2005; Panizza, 2005; 
Chiapponi 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Hawking, Riding, & Mudde, 
2012). consisting of the work of authors who do not seek a definitive and ideal-
type definition of populism. The common starting point for these scholars is 
instead a performance of the language and, consequently, an emphasis on 
political discourses produced by political leaders. For example, according to 
the interpretation given by Francisco Panizza, scholars such as Peter Worsley, 
Edward Shills, Ernesto Laclau and Margaret Canovan share the idea that 
populism is "an appeal to the people against existing power structures" 
(Panizza et al. ., 2005: 10). Intended as a discursive style or a peculiar way of 
doing politics, populism is thus "an accessible way of identification for every 
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political actor within a discourse field in which the notion of people's 
sovereignty and its inevitable corollary, the conflict between the powerful and 
those who do not have power, are central to his political imagination "(Panizza 
et al., 2005: 9). Within the discursive conception of politics, to say it with 
Laclau's words, "a movement is not populist because the politics or ideology 
it contains contains populist elements, but because it shows a particular logic 
of articulation of the contents, whatever they are" (Laclau, 2005:38). Within 
this scientific paradigm, the (political) discourse is by its nature constitutive 
(performative) and does not express a pre-existing and stable nature of the 
actor he speaks. It is useless for Laclau, and for authors who use the discursive 
approach to ask who is or is not a populist, the only sensible question is "to 
what extent is a populist movement?" (Laclau, 2005: 50). The discourse 
approach is thus more appropriate than the ideal-type approach to try to 
address the already mentioned Mudde affirmation with respect to the populist 
Zeitgeist which would be the figure identifying contemporary politics. 
Without postulating that all political actors have changed their ideology by 
assuming a populist, one can instead profoundly investigate to what extent and 
even political actors who are normally not considered 'populists' use rhetoric, 
style and discursive elements that produce "communicative frames cognitive 
"(Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Hawking, Riding & Mudde, 2012), referring to 
populist speech. 
 There is, finally, a third possibility. I am referring to that line of studies 
that defines populism as a 'widespread mentality'. An example of this approach 
can be considered as the work of Marco Tarchi who studies populism from the 
concept of characteristic mentality as originally proposed by Juan Linz (Linz, 
1975): "mentality is an intellectual attitude, 'ideology is an intellectual content; 
the first is psychic predisposition, the second is reflection, self-interpretation. 
" (Tarchi, 2015) And while "Mindset is ahead, the ideology follows. Still, 
mentality is devoid of form, fluctuating, while ideology is firmly formed. (...) 
Another important point is that, with regard to ideologies, mentalities show 
some vagueness; in fact, "we refer to generic values" and "we use the discrete 
and pragmatic incorporation of elements derived from the dominant 
ideological centers at the moment" (Ivi, pg. 51). As for the analysis of 
populism as a communicative style, however, according to the opinion of the 
writer, the perfectional power attributed to the populist leader has been 
reduced. It is capable of generating processes of symbolic integration by 
giving rise to a 'collective' (that is to its' people ') that previously did not exist 
in the form of political discourse and therefore of political conflict, yet its 
ability to' imagine and giving shape to the people 'is neither absolute nor less 
free from the social, psychological and cultural reality within which the leader 
is to operate. Within this perspective, Roberto Cartocci has identified, for 
example, the characteristic traits of a populist Italian culture that would be 
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based on the various political forms of populism that have crossed our country 
over time (Cartocci, 1996; Tarchi, 2015). From these cultural and 
psychological elements, populism would then be presented as "a feeling, a 
moral attitude, or, rather, a reflection of a psychological, emotional and 
cognitive structure that pre-existent and produces" (Tarchi , 2015: 48). 
  
Populism as a multidimensional concept 
 The three research strands that have been up to mentioned here have 
been presented and lived by many of the authors cited as mutually exclusive. 
From a strictly theoretical point of view, the tendency to proclaim its own 
research approach is the only valid for understanding the nature and dynamics 
of populism. On this point, the opinion who writes is that the degree of mutual 
exclusivity of the various approaches has been overwhelmingly exaggerated, 
and that this position depends in part on the need to distinguish and strengthen 
its scientific proposal, but also and above all by not having treated the 
populism as a multidimensional concept. 
 Unlike many other concepts, in fact, populism shares its core with 
some elements of democratic politics, and the latter reflects a fundamental 
property; that of power and duty to be conceived and studied simultaneously 
both as a 'normative ideal' and as 'empirical realization' (Sartori, 1993; Sartori, 
2007). Populism is also composed of this dual soul, that normative, regarding 
the dimension of what must be and of the state of politics, and that of its 
epiphenomenic manifestations, of political practices, linguistic style and 
various form of leadership. And this dual nature not only must not be 
misunderstood or denied, but it must be used as a heuristic element to 
articulate and properly understand the challenges that on more than one level 
and in various forms populism advances towards democracy. The two 
concepts must therefore be compared on the two levels by distinguishing the 
normative dimension from the empirical one, well knowing that a level, 
though distinct and analyzable separately, then necessarily refers to the other. 
Using this method I hope to be able to demonstrate that much of the confusion 
that was detected at the very beginning of this essay is mainly due to the lack 
of this distinction for which we have finished comparing and evaluating either 
just one of the two dimensions or, erroneously, the normative side with the 
empirical dimension of the two concepts. 
 As has already been mentioned, the search for the idealtypic core of 
populism has generated various proposals. Among these proposals, what now 
seems to enjoy greater consensus is what defines populism as 'subtle ideology'. 
The limitation of this conceptualization, however, is that, to be acceptable, it 
has to resort to a very general and abstract definition of particular ideology. A 
definition that, therefore, because of the features mentioned above, is likely to 
be very 'general-generic' and to explain everything and nothing, to become a 
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linguistic passepartout that very little offers us in terms of the specificity and 
intent of the concept and hence in terms of explanatory power. The incongruity 
of a concept like that of 'subtle ideology' can be  usefully understood as soon 
as we use a definition that reflects more what the main ideologies of the last 
century were. 
 In this case we will find, for example, definitions like the following: 
"a generic term that can be applied to any political doctrine, to social 
movements characterized by theoretical elaboration, ideological-cultural 
orientation, and economic and social policy. Alongside this generic meaning, 
however, the term has retained a more specific and narrow meaning, which is 
used to indicate precise doctrines and political movements (communism, 
Nazism, Fascism), shared by some characteristics: the presence of a 
theoretical background more or less elaborated, which claims to provide an 
exhaustive (and definitive) explanation of historical and social processes; the 
attempt to totally transform society and man, according to a precise model; 
the intense emotional participation of militants, often similar to 'religious 
faith'; the leadership role of a party with a hectic and capillary organization 
" (Enciclopedia Treccani on-line; Voce: Populismo translated by the Author) 
 It is evident in this case that populism lacks virtually all of the features 
typical of ideology except for the normative dimension, and it is not enough 
to put the 'subtle' adjective to resolve the issue without submitting the concept 
of ideology to an undue 'stretch' (Sartori, 2011) that erodes much of the 
explanatory power as well as disconnects it from any historical analysis of the 
concept. Of ideology, populism does not have the broad theoretical elaboration 
necessary to codify thought systems (ideologies) which, starting with some 
key assumptions about human nature and social phenomena, define the path 
of history and link it to a political project radical that ultimately fulfills the 
emancipation of man or, in any case, the full deployment of his presumed 
'nature'. Populism is a symbolic system with rather limited regulatory 
requirements (the task it is self-asserting is to 'put the true people on the throne 
of democracy') without a political project, without specific content, without 
specific and constant references to subsystems which is not that of politics. 
This is precisely one of the major singularities of the populist phenomenon; it 
is capable of generating strong feelings of identification and mobilization 
while remaining with a nucleus of meaning absolutely empty (Laclau, 2005 in 
Panizza et al., 2005) in terms of specific policy proposals and of subsystem 
regulation. 
 From a normative point of view, populism focuses entirely on an 
organic idea of the people (defined by default the only legitimate subject 
existing on the political scene) that is capable of expressing its own will which 
must become translated in the political and institutional decision-making 
without any changes or further interpretations. Populism is therefore an 
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expression of a widespread mentality rather than representing some sort of 
teleological and emancipatory ideology, yet it does not diminish the 
widespread mentality from which it derives legitimacy and political 
consensus. Although it needs a social and psychological basis that has some 
specific features, populism retains its 'political autonomy' given by the leader's 
ability to express a performance function to evoke from time to time the 
'people'. Populism is therefore, at the level of the regulatory system, an 
axiomatic and doctrinal interpretation of democracy (a concept that is similar 
to that of the 'disfigurement of democracy' proposed by Nadia Urbinati 
(Urbinati, 2014)), which focuses all around the idea of popular will as the only 
and united source of democratic legitimacy. Of ideological politics, populism 
retains the will and ability to create strong, non-negotiable identities. It is, 
therefore, ad absurdum, an ideological policy, that is to say a strong 
identification, which spreads just in the era of the conclamed dissolution of 
the political ideologies that characterized the period of mass democracy. And 
that populism has elements in common with political ideologies, although it 
does not present the essential characteristic of emancipatory teleological 
design, it is demonstrated by the fact that the same populism develops in many 
cases hybridizing precisely with pre-existing political ideologies. For 
example, right-wing populists (Schain, Zolberg and Hossay, 2002; Ignazi, 
2003; Norris, 2004; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Greven, 2016; Mudde 2016) or 
left populisms (Pappas, 2014; Mouffe, 2016), are the concrete situations in 
which the populist leader fills the programmatic vacuum nucleus around 
which the populist phenomenon develops with some (but never all) of the ideal 
and programmatic content typical of a preformed political ideology and 
therefore available for symbolic hybridization processes. 
 The second dimension along which Populism must be reconstructed 
and analyzed is  its own peculiar discourse logic, a specific mode of 
constructing political discourse that can not, for example, be left out of a 
continent of manichean division of the political field. The people are therefore 
always evoked 'by contrast and opposition', it can not exist unless it is in the 
presence of its enemies' (Laclau, 2005). There is no people, within the 
symbolic populist universe, if not in opposition to something or someone. It 
can only be summoned 'by contrast and difference'.The construction of 
political discourse by the populists is therefore of a "schmittian" nature, that 
is, it conceives and proposes a dichotomic friend / enemy politics within which 
the space for equally legitimate living of the positions and interests and for 
their partial and temporary composition tends to be depopulated if not quite 
obliterated. It is probably not a case that the most important political manifesto 
produced by the ideologist of the Italian populist movement Cinque Stelle, 
Gianroberto Casaleggio, is titled "We are in War" (Casaleggio and Grillo, 
2011) to reiterate if it is needed that the universe symbolic reference is that of 
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radical and extreme conflict, of the 'deadly' fight against enemies. Although 
the consequences of this discourse logic are often overwhelming or declining 
in ways that seem to be compatible with democratic politics, it is better to say 
it clearly and once in the past: populist speech, understood in the simplicity of 
its ideal-type form , it is not a democratic discourse as it denies the root 
elements of pluralism. In particular, ideologically populist subjects tend to 
deny the legitimacy of political competitors, disregarding the representative 
capacity of the people and relegating them to the role of enemies and traitors 
of the people. 
 In the last dimension, this popular democracy doctrine that we call 
populism is in connection with a specific and sufficiently widespread 'forma 
mentis' expressing the specific figure of the psychological relationships 
between leaders and followers, but also among the followers themselves itself 
an important element that distinguishes it from other organizational 
phenomena that concern democratic pluralism. Populism is linked with 
historical moments that see the rapid development of profound economic and 
social transformations and is "characteristic of periods of de-alignment that 
involve the radical rewriting of the social boundaries along which the society 
was previously structured "(Polany, 1974, Panizza et al., 2005: 14) It is 
therefore a phenomenon that develops in close correlation with the crisis of 
pre-existing identities and is, from a psychological and social point of view, a 
process of de-identification from previous identities and re-identification with 
the new populist identity (Ivi: 10). Thus, "a populist identity emerges from the 
displacement of specific identities of bearers of particular questions 
(confinants, workers, peasants, unemployed, women, ethnic groups, etc.) and 
their reintegration into the imaginary unity of the people" (Ivi: 14) . In this, 
populism "is usually a reaction to the feeling that the foundations of the 
community to which it refers are disintegrating" (Tarchi, 2016: 6). The 
populist leader feeds the anguish resulting from the (partial) loss of the identity 
created by the economic-technological-social upheavals by focusing on some 
key objects that seem clearly identifiable and necessarily involve the existence 
of one or more enemies. He daily remembers, with great emphasis, the 
existence of these dangers and their enemies to fight (potential terrorist 
immigrants who steal jobs and homes to those legitimately entitled, corrupt 
politicians, bureaucrats ineffective and arrogant, parasitic intellectuals, 
serving and lying journalists, unscrupulous economic lobbies, oppressive 
international institutions, foreign powers shading in the shadows, etc.) thus 
fueling the state of collective anguish, giving it an intelligible form and 
providing pseudo-explanations that reflect the opposing dichotomous 
dynamics that have been repeatedly mentioned in order to allow the 
identification of scapegoats to which the evoked anguish catalyses. The 
solutions proposed are simple, radical and it is not uncommon to use symbolic 
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and verbal violence. They are, in most cases, demagogic solutions as no 
realistic means, procedures and direct and indirect costs, which would arise 
from their adoption, are never explicitly disclosed. What matters is not the 
realization of the same, but the suggestion that they are capable of generating 
towards their followers and the degree of attention they can bring to an ever-
fragmented and unbiased public identity. Populist politics is, from a 
psychological point of view, a policy that is based on the radicalization of the 
dichotomy of mistrust / confidence. Just as the mistrust is high on professional 
politicians, the ability to represent the true interests of the people, the 
institutions, and in all the subjects that can be considered as enemies, likewise 
trust is the ultimate in respect to the leader, outsiders not spotted by the original 
sin of politics acting as "living theory" (Tarchi, 2016: 6). And if the process of 
mass identification in one leader is 'the normal way of contemporary politics', 
populist identification has some specific characteristics. In particular, the 
leader presents itself as a 'political outsider' and 'one of the people', thus 
placing himself on a plan of perfect parity and consonance with his (potential) 
followers. Officially, he does not possess any special quality, which would 
bring him outside the people, except that he has seen in a clearer way the truth 
that is unfairly denied and hidden by other political actors. In this sense, 
populist leadership, if investigated through the concept of charisma, is an 
interesting oxymoron. The populist leader presents himself as 'one of the 
people' without any extraordinary quality, but at the same time the language 
that he speaks is the revelation of the truth concealed by power, and the way 
he points to is that of moral regeneration of politics by neutralizing enemies 
of the people with forms ranging from simply defeating electoral to 
incarceration or physical elimination by passing through 'scraping'. The 
overall approach to speech is therefore of a highly charismatic type, and it is 
not by chance the only true communicative code that it uses is that given by 
true / false dichotomy. What the populist leader says is always and evidently 
true 'by definition' and disinterested, while what the enemies say is always and 
in any case false, dictated by the interest of part or the result of pure 
wickedness. Since populism is a 'moral policy' that wants to do 'moral politics', 
it can only use the commodity code just mentioned. And while it is true that 
this code is normally used within political competition, it is worth noting that 
the radical separation between true and false implemented by genuinely 
populist leaders is very often carried out within a broader discursive context 
that is absolutely peculiar: the conspiracy. The plot is the deus-ex-machina of 
populism; a pseudo-explanation that is sometimes generic and sometimes 
overly detailed but always based on invented or manipulated information that 
can nourish and nourish populist paranoia given that "the current populist heart 
supports democracy but does not want to be cheated by political machinations 
"(Mudde, 2004). It is no coincidence that conspiracy theories and populisms 
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are intriguing often and willingly. On the other hand, the psychological root 
of populism and conspiracy is the same; both phenomena aim to "regain 
control and predictability" (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Sullivan, Landau & 
Rothschild, 2012), through the psychologically compensatory action given by 
the identification of enemies to be fought in a world shaken by profound 
transformations that questioned identities acquired from a deep and 
generalized mistrust in others. Both phenomena provide pseudo-explanations 
of phenomena that are not easily understood due to their wide scope, 
psychological weight, and the amount of consequences difficult to calculate. 
The key point is that these tautological pseudo-explanations work if the source 
that proposes and supports it is believed to be absolutely credible. It is the 
bond of trust that is established both horizontally and vertically within the 
'reactive mobilization communities', such as the populist or conspiratorial ones 
that hold it together, and this bond depends very strongly on sharing strong 
feelings of distrust towards the world external and have identified the same 
enemies as a source of their own dissatisfaction situation. In the case of the 
mentality characteristic of the populist style, this psychological propensity 
deriving from a latent and confused state of dissatisfaction is directed by the 
leader towards specific targets and used as a lever for political mobilization. 
This task becomes simpler when developing rapid and important technological 
changes that invest in the field of mass political communication. These 
changes, in fact, push for disintermediation between leaders and voters, and at 
the same time question the authority of the sources of information that until 
then dominated the communicative space (Diamonds, 2014). As the advent of 
the radio became inextricably linked to the affirmation of the fascist, Nazi, and 
Communist populist movements, today the widespread internet diffusion 
allows two fundamental reasons for the emergence of populist actors: 1) a 
further disintermediation between leaders and citizens who assumes forms of 
interactivity that is only comparatively comparable but which, however, 
reduces the hierarchical differential between leaders and citizens over the one-
way and top-down communication typical of television; 2) the creation of 
"alternative" low cost informational sources with broad dissemination 
potential to traditional ones through which to spread the 'truths' to illuminate 
the people and the 'censored news' that the corrupt system of traditional media 
does not carry because it is an integral part of the 'conspiracy against the 
people'. 
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, our definition of populism as a multidimensional 
phenomenon: 1) refuses to see existing definitions of populism as mutually 
exclusive; 2) distinguishes between regulatory dimension and empirical 
realization of the same as is the case for the concept of democracy; 3) identifies 
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the normative dimension of the concept with a political doctrine expressing a 
peculiar vision of democracy; 4) notes that this doctrine produces a radical 
policy based on the creation of non-negotiable collective identities, but does 
not have a peculiar design nucleus, a situation that allows any hybridization 
with the existing political ideologies; 5) conceives this doctrine as a real 
political phenomenon only in connection with a 'characteristic mentality', that 
is, with a more or less diffused cultural and psychological substrate that 
represents its consensual humus and which determines specific and peculiar 
relationships between leaders and followers (hence the question of the 
charismatic nature of populist leadership); 6) agrees with the literature that 
identifies a specific populist mode of constructing political discourse, but does 
not reduce the whole populist phenomenon to this discursive logic or to a 
peculiar political style, but see in it one of the key elements to be analyzed.  
Finally it should be said is not necessary that the two constituent dimensions 
of the identified populism (normative and empirical) must coexist. If the 
assumption of the doctrinal-normative dimension by a political leader is 
normally a corollary of a development of political practice that reflects all or 
many of the tools and techniques of popular consensus seeking populism, it is 
possible that certain elements of the practical populist politics (ex. 
psychological dimension and technique of building political discourse) can be 
used in different degrees by political actors who do not take the populist 
doctrine as a normative reference. In the first case, that is, in the situation in 
which both dimensions of populism are present and developed explicitly, one 
can speak for example of 'integral populism', or 'full developed populism' that 
is, of a closed symbolic universe within which political practice, collective 
identity and normative dimension show a high degree of internal coherence 
and tend to strengthen and bind each other. We swear then in the presence of 
a populism that is very close to its idealtipic shape. In the second case, that is, 
when only the empirical-practical dimension will be taken from the political 
leader of the turn, we will find ourselves in a plurality of political proposals 
which, with varying degrees and accents, will use a logic of speech or some 
style rhetoric typical of populism in strictly utilitarian and economic context. 
In such cases, it would be more appropriate to ask how different actors appear 
to be populists and, secondly, how and why they have borrowed some practical 
tools of populism without sharing the fundamental doctrinal axioms. 
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